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ABSTRACT
Due to the corporate scandals in the business world, corporate governance 
is big concern and becomes an alarming issue. Bursa Malaysia required 
all PLCs to have corporate disclosures in order to cultivate sound 
corporate governance, meanwhile auditors act as watchdogs in ensuring 
the disclosures. However, auditor switching is evident and disorder of 
auditor switching often takes place in Malaysia. Thus, this paper seeks 
to empirically investigate the association between corporate governance, 
auditor switching, and financial performance of Malaysian PLCs. 
Secondary data on a total number of 100 PLCs from years 2009 to 2013 
are used. The results reveal that separation of position for BOD chairman 
and CEO as well as large board size lead to better overseeing of the 
management on behalf of shareholders, which drives the firm performance. 
Surprisingly, independent directors do not definitely lead to good firm 
performance, especially when they do not play their role properly. When 
there is CEO/chairman duality, tendency of auditor switching is low 
due to a long-tenure relationship with auditor. A high powered structure 
in Malaysia that concentrates on top-down relationship prompts no 
objection from board members and independent directors when a less 
crucial decision such as auditor switching decision is made. Auditors 
as the mediator play significant roles between corporate governance 
and financial performance since they provide creditability and greater 
assurance to investors. Therefore, this paper has vital implications and 
gives insight for government to emphasize the auditors’ roles as agents 
for ensuring impacts on the association between corporate governance 
and financial performance.
Auditors Switching in the Relationship Between Corporate 
Governance and Financial Performances - Evidence from 
Malaysian Public Listed Companies (PLCs)
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance becomes an alarming issue in the business world nowadays due to the 
existence of corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. In Malaysia, there are few PLCs 
involved in such cases, including Megan Media Holdings Berhad, and Transmile Group. Thus, 
effective corporate governance is important as it helps to ensure the businesses are running 
smoothly. In the direction of coping with the breakdown of governance, United States had 
created the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. However, as one of the emerging countries, Securities 
Commission in Malaysia issued MCCG to nurture more desirable corporate governance 
amongst PLCs. In addition, Bursa Malaysia required all PLCs to have corporate disclosures. 
Auditors are required to act as guard dogs in ensuring that the disclosures provide true and fair 
view as many users of these information rely on them for financial decisions. Furthermore, since 
the auditors are agents of the firms due to their being appointed by the shareholders through the 
board of directors, an issue arises as to compliance with professional guidelines and standards, 
all in an attempt to satisfy the needs of their employers (Shareholders) with regards to what is 
to be covered and uncovered which constitute a further test of the global or local competence, 
technical capabilities and level of experience and exposure Siala et al( 2009). Nonetheless, 
from the perspective of the agency theory, part of the audit responsibilities is to uncover the 
excesses of the managers that are not in line with the expectation of the shareholders. Thus, the 
issue arises as to whether auditor switching could have direct or indirect effect on the financial 
performance and corporate governance activities of a firm.
However, some PLCs are trying to switch auditors to portend the companies’ true 
conditions. Turner et al (2005) stated that the trend of auditor switching is increasing, for 
instance, 59% of the surveyed companies switched the auditors as they did not make adequate 
disclosures. In Malaysia, auditor switching is evident and disorder of auditor switching often 
take place. An example of auditor switching disorder is 1MDB’s case, where the auditor was 
changed for three times within five years. Shanmugam (2014) observed that the recent auditor 
switching in 1MDB was due to an extension of date in annual report submission as various 
new acquisitions had varied the business orientation and caused business diversification. 
Nevertheless, it has raised the uncertainty on transparency of 1MDB in corporate reporting. As 
a result, it shows that ineffectiveness of corporate governance may result in auditor switching 
and the companies’ financial performance may be affected.
Therefore, a research on the auditors switching and its effects on corporate governance and 
financial performance of Malaysian PLCs is very much needed. This study is to investigate 
the association between corporate governance, auditor switching, and financial performance 
of Malaysian PLCs. Moreover, it also investigates the mediating effect of auditor switching 
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in the association between corporate governance and financial performance. It hopes that this 
study provide further useful insights in corporate governance area in future.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Viewpoints
There are three theories that explain the reasons for auditor switching. Agency theory is 
used when the rationale for auditor switching is associated to agency-related incentives for 
higher quality audit (Francis and Wilson, 1988; Nyakuwanika, 2014). For signalling theory, 
management teams in relation to agency issues are more likely to use it as switching to higher 
quality auditors, since it provides better signal of promising expectations and indicate that 
shareholders’ interests are being monitored properly. For insurance theory, management teams 
who undergo losses due to material misstatements are more probably to use it. The auditor 
“insured” companies, are presumed to give better audit quality reports and provide useful 
insight to improve companies’ performance. Nevertheless, there are arguments of insufficiency 
of power in explaining the reasons and rationale for remarkable statistic on auditor switching. 
It is because they neglect the behavioural factors and present only partial explanation regarding 
auditor switching (Beattie and Fearnley, 1998). Moreover, corporate governance mechanisms 
influences company’s auditor switching determination (Lin and Liu, 2010).
An Overview of Malaysian Corporate Governance
Malaysia was among the earliest to perform corporate governance reforms in the Asian region 
(Securities Commission Malaysia, 2011). Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG 
2012), Capital Market Master Plan, as well as Financial Sector Master Plan are the fundamental 
references of the development for Malaysian corporate governance. These frameworks gave 
the information on the background rules as well as the prescription on implementation towards 
sound corporate governance. According to MCCG 2012, corporate governance is described as 
action and formation to operate companies’ activities towards strengthening the prosperity as 
well as accountability of companies in order to achieve long-lasting shareholders’ value and 
take consideration of other stakeholders’ benefits. To express it in simple words, it is a function 
of managing companies in order to provide accountability to stakeholders. The functions are 
oversight, managerial, compliance, and external audit, where inter-relatedness with each other 
take place in order to achieve sound corporate governance practices. 
Components of Corporate Governance
1. CEO/Chairman Duality
The Board of Directors (BOD) plays an essential role in making sure that the management 
team has acted bona fide in order to maintain sound corporate governance framework. BOD 
is the important person who executes an oversight function. Yet, there is case that the director 
is simultaneously holding two positions, which are CEO and BOD chairman. In other words, 
it is called CEO/chairman duality while there is no segregation of duty of CEO and BOD 
chairman ( Bozec, 2005).
Int. Journal of Economics and Management 10(1): 53 – 68 (2016)
56
2.  Board Size 
It is a proxy of corporate governance element as the board size is tied to the head of corporate 
governance as well as being the source for generating experience and expertise information and 
effective management monitoring that enhance greater firm performance Coles et.al, (2008). 
Due to these reasons, board size is deemed to have a crucial part and component on the board’s 
functioning. MCCG and Bursa Malaysia are silent on the board size, but it is suggested that 
board size should not be too big nor too small (Shakir, 2008). The maximum and minimum 
number is dependent on the company’s Articles of Association (A&A). 
3.  Presence of Independent Directors in Company Board
Presence of independent directors in a company board is defined as the extent of independence 
of outside officer in the directors’ board (Nuhu, 2014). It is measured by the percentage of 
independent directors over total directors. Independent director includes the ‘non-interest’, 
‘outside’, ‘non-executive’, ‘non-management’, and ‘non-employee’ elements (Clarke, 2006). 
Auditor Switching
Auditor switching implies the resignation and discharge of auditors’ duties from the client firm 
(Turner et al, 2005). Normally, auditor switching has been perceived in a negative manner. It is 
due to the auditors going to lose their clients while the clients may hide the truth of company’s 
performance and incur more costs (Nazri et al, 2012).
Financial Performance 
Financial performance is the function of executing financial activity and the degree of the extent 
that financial objectives are being attained (Trivedi, ‎2010). There are three main functions of 
financial performance, which are as the tool of financial management, purpose of business 
organisation, and channel of motivation (Needly, 2007, Ong and Teh, 2008). ROA, ROE, and 
Tobin’s Q are used in this study. There is a well-being balance on the financial performance as 
ROA and ROE reveal the historical while Tobin’s Q displays succeeding financial performance.
Relationship Between Corporate Governance, Auditor Switching and Financial 
Performance
1. Corporate Governance vs. Financial Performance 
The impact of CEO/chairman duality on corporate performance has been extensively debated 
as there are different findings from different researches. Tian and Lau (2001) stated that 
favourable association was between CEO/chairman duality and financial performance in terms 
of operation efficiency (ROA and ROE) and financial strength (shareholder’s right ratio). On 
the other hand, according to Hsu et al (2012), the relationship of CEO/chairman duality and 
company’s financial performance is congruence with agency theory, where segregation of duty 
of CEO and BOD chairman promotes effective observation and control of CEO that leads to 
good financial performance. Peng et al (2007) found that CEO/chairman duality brings both 
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pros and cons effects towards the financial performance as it acts as the two-edged sword. In a 
contradicting view, Zulkarnain and Shamsher (2008), Valenti et al (2011) discovered the lack 
of support in the relationship of CEO/chairman duality and financial performance. 
For board size, there are different perspectives of thought with respect to the association 
connecting with financial performance grounded on different researches. Among the 174 
sampled companies in United States (US), a positive association is shown between board 
size along with company’s financial performance (Belkhir, 2008). The results are proved by 
setting company’s size, leadership structure of board, CEO tenure, independence of board, 
and ownership structure as control variables. On the other hand, Beiner et al (2003) stated that 
a negative association is formed between company’s board size and financial performance. 
It is because the reaped benefits from large board size are offset by the drawbacks such as 
collaboration, communication, and decision making difficulties. 
Past researchers investigated the linkage between the presence of independent directors 
with financial performance from different perspectives. It is found that there was significant 
positive association between presence of independent directors in Thai bank and the financial 
performance (Pathan et al, 2008). The result implied that independent directors are important 
people who have greater oversight than other directors towards Thai banks as they retained the 
reputation of market. Saat et al (2011) has a more comprehensive research, where it examined 
this relationship in Malaysia context from the view of capable independent financial director, 
superior independent director, and existence of family members in BOD. The outcome was 
that independent directors have positive relationship with financial performance when there 
were capable independent financial director or superior independent director. It has negative 
association when there was an existence of family member director.
2. Corporate Governance vs. Auditor Switching
Past studies have shown consistent results in their researches for association between CEO/
chairman duality as well as auditor switching. In the research of Lin and Liu (2010), it is 
revealed that CEO/chairman duality has significant relationship with auditor switching, where 
the company is more probably changed to a smaller auditor when the CEO simultaneously 
holds the BOD chairman’s position. According to Ianniello et al (2013), the result is alike with 
research of Lin and Liu (2010), where it is stated that negative association is linking the CEO/
chairman duality along with the choice of reputed auditor.
Past researches have shown inconsistent results for the association between company’s 
board size as well as auditor switching. According to Ianniello et al (2013), large company’s 
board size is deemed to have an unfavourable impact on corporate governance because it incurs 
organizational and coordination issues. Due to this reason, the company that has large board 
size switches to a reputed and large auditor to perceive an improvement of financial statement’s 
quality. In the research of Lin and Liu (2010), it is revealed that the effects of company’s board 
size in the Chinese listed firms towards the auditor switching is not conclusive. It may indicate 
that due to the lacking of competency in corporate governance, company’s board size does not 
influence the fruitful oversight function in their companies.
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Researches in the past studies have shown consistent results on relationship between 
presence of independent directors and financial performance. According to Abidin et al (2006), 
it is indicated that there is less chance for the occurrence of auditor switching issue with the 
existence of independent directors in the company board. In addition, Zhang et al (2013) 
observed that when percentage of independent director rate is higher, the auditor switching issue 
is less probably to happen. The presence of independent directors is quantified by independent 
director rate, thus, it is implied that there is negative association connecting the existence of 
independent directors in company board and auditor switching. 
3. Auditor Switching Vs. Financial Performance
Auditor switching leads to the reduction in trustworthiness and reliability of financial reports. 
A slump in the companies’ stock prices or a rise in the companies’ cost of capital may happen 
after the announcement of auditor switching. Nevertheless, there is a controvert view formed by 
Chang et al (2008) who explored on the impacts of switching auditors from a Big 4 to a non-Big 
4 auditor firm from year 2002 to 2006. The result is that the investors do not consider the switch 
to non-Big 4 auditors as bad news and thus the market reaction is not unfavourable. Chan et 
al (2011) analysed the stock and earnings performance of companies after auditor switching. 
It exhibits that the companies’ financial performance is positive after auditor switching, no 
matter the switching among or between the Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors.
4. Auditor Switching As Mediator of Corporate Governance and Financial Performance
To the best of knowledge, there is none of the extant researches that examines the auditor 
switching as having association linking corporate governance together with financial 
performance. Previous studies just pay attention primarily to the relationship between each 
pair of these three variables, such as the connection between corporate governance vs. financial 
performance, corporate governance vs. auditor switching, and auditor switching vs. financial 
performance. Applying auditor switching as mediator appears to be the theoretically most 
reasonable path to answer the “how” question on corporate governance leading to financial 
performance.
METHODOLOGY 
This research uses quantitative research approach. Malaysian PLCs are being chosen as the 
samples because PLCs have more contribution towards the growing economy. PLCs can enlarge 
the shareholder base by engaging credible investors, who provide sizable capital investment. 
Malaysia is being chosen as it is an emerging country. This study adopts the annual reports, 
which are downloaded from Bursa Malaysia website according to the selected Malaysian PLCs 
listing from years 2009 to 2013 for corporate governance and auditor switching data in order 
to determine if auditor switching had persisted in line with the studies of (Malek, (2005) and 
Abdul Nasser et al, (2006) . It also adopts Datastream (web-based) for financial performance 
measurements from years 2009 to 2013 in order to achieve consistency.
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As identified by Hair et al (2005), a sample size is appropriate and adequate if there are 
100 to 200 samples.  Moreover, there are at least 50 samples needed to achieve a low bias of 
standard error (standard deviation of the sampling distribution) in a research that involve a 
single mediator variable (MacKinnon et al, 2002). Therefore, sample size of this study is set as 
100 samples. Simple random sampling is applied to avoid the result being biased. Allowance 
of incomplete data such as PLCs having incomplete set of annual reports from years 2009 to 
2013 are taken into account for data analysis purpose. Those PLCs that have incomplete data 
are not being chosen for this research. Cleaning data process is allowed when checking the 
normality of data. A summary of research variables are as followed:
Table 1 Operationalisation of variables
Variables Items Proxies Operationalisation
Independent 
Variables
Corporate 
Governance
CEO/
chairman 
duality 
(DUAL)
DUAL = 1, if BOD chairman is not CEO  
DUAL = 0, if BOD chairman is the CEO  
Related studies: Tian and Lau (2001); Lin and Liu 
(2010); Hsu et al (2012); Yang and Zhao (2014) 
Board size 
(SIZE)
Aggregation of board members in the board. 
Related studies: Beiner et al (2003); Belkhir (2008); 
Pathan et al (2008)
Presence of 
independent 
directors 
(ID)
Quantified by the percentage of independent 
directors over total directors. 
Formula: 
   independent directors       
x  100%
          Total directors      
Related studies: Pathan et al (2008); Miwa (2015)
Dependent 
Variables
Financial 
Performance
Return on 
assets (ROA)
Measured the efficiency of company in utilizing its 
assets.
Formula: 
                 Net income 
          Average of total assets 
Related studies: Tian and Lau (2001); Beiner et al 
(2003); Belkhir (2008); Pathan et al (2008); Peng et 
al (2007); Chan et al (2011); Hsu et al (2012); Yang 
and Zhao (2014)
Return 
on equity  
(ROE)
Conventional measure of shareholders’ gain.
Formula:
                 Net income 
     Average shareholder equity, 
Related studies: Tian and Lau (2001); Beiner et al 
(2003); Pathan et al (2008); Valenti et al (2011); 
Yang and Zhao (2014)
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TOBIN’s Q Ratio of market value of firm over sum of assets
Formula: 
              Total market value of firm  
                          Total assets 
Related studies: Beiner et al (2003); Belkhir (2008); 
Yang and Zhao (2014)
Mediating 
Variable
Auditor 
switching
AS AS = 0, if auditors have not been switched,  
AS = 1, if auditors have been switched  
Related studies: Chadegani et al (2011); Nazri et al 
(2012)
Control 
Variable
Company 
size
CSIZE Logarithm of assets aggregation of company. 
Formula: log (total assets) 
Related studies: Tian and Lau (2001); Beiner et al 
(2003); Belkhir (2008); Pathan et al (2008); Peng et 
al (2007); Hsu et al (2012)
Regression analysis is being applied and four regression models are formed, which are:
Model 1:  FP = α + β CG + ε Model 3:  FP = α + β AS + ε
Model 2:  AS = α + β CG + ε Model 4:  FP = α + β1 CG + β2 AS + ε
Where:
 α - Intercept  CG - Corporate governance
 β - Regression coefficient AS - Auditor switching
 ε - Error term  FP - Financial performance
In addition, Sobel test that is used for examining the mediation effect (Warner, 2013), 
is An Interactive Calculation Tool For Mediation Test credited to Preacher and Leonardelli 
(2010). In this research, it is used to compare the extent of indirect impact of CG on FP to 
depict null hypothesis, H0: DE equivalent to 0. The indirect effect of CG on FP is obtained by 
testing the product of the D (CG to AS path) and E (AS to FP path) coefficients. DE= (F- F’), 
where F is the simple effect of CG on FP that is not controlled by AS, and F’ is the CG to FP 
path coefficient with the mediation effect of AS. There is statistically significant effect of DE 
product if z-test statistic is greater than +1.96 or below -1.96.
Table 1 (Cont.)
 CG
CG
FP
FP
F
F’
Sketch A
Sketch B
AS
Figure 1  Sketch A:  A direct action diagram of CG influences FP   
 Sketch B:  A mediation model diagram of CG influences FP via AS
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DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Sampled Companies Profiling
Table 2 Sectors of Sampled Companies
Sectors Total
Industrial Products 31
Trading/Services 16
Consumers Products 20
Others 33
100
It is shown in the above table 2, that the sector distributions are not consistent with each 
other due to a simple random sampling technique used in the research. Moreover, there is no 
particular sector not being chosen as it is to avoid any bias on particular sector in terms of the 
effectiveness of corporate governance, frequency of auditor switching, and firm performance.
Table 3 Characteristics Independent Variables and Mediating Variable of Sampled Companies
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Variables N / % N / % N / % N / % N / %
DUAL
BOD equal to CEO 21 21 17 15 13
BOD not equal to CEO 79 79 83 85 87
BOARD SIZE
 0-3 0 0 0 0 0
4-7 63 61 62 63 62
8-11 34 35 37 36 37
≥12 3 4 1 1 1
ID (%)
0-10 0 0 0 0 0
>10-20 0 0 1 0 2
>20-30 9 8 8 9 8
>30-40 34 35 35 36 36
>40-50 40 35 40 34 27
>50 17 22 16 21 27
AS
No switch 100 79 80 82 83
Switch:  
-To Big 4 0 4 6 4 3
-To Non-Big 4 0 17 14 14 14
The table 3 above shows the characteristics of sampled companies. It reveals that more 
than 75% of sample companies from years 2009 to 2013 have no CEO/chairman duality in 
their companies. It implies that most sampled companies complied with MCCG that required 
the separation of position between BOD chairman and CEO to ensure a balance between 
power and authority when making decisions. As the percentage of separation of both positions 
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increases, it shows that Malaysian companies view it as an important feature for sound corporate 
governance.
For board size, Harper (2006) indicated that the most effective board size consists of 4 to 
10 members, but it can go up to maximum of 12 members. It shows that most of the sample 
companies have a total number of four to seven board members from years 2009 to 2013, 
which is within the range of 61% to 63% for years 2009 to 2013. The second highest board 
members in board size are in between eight to eleven, which is in the range of 34% to 37% 
of the sampled companies from years 2009 to 2013. Therefore, sample companies fulfil the 
requirement of the most effective board size as stated by Harper (2006). 
For the perspective of independent director (in percentage), it indicates that there is a wide 
range between percentages of independent directors in sampled companies within year 2009 
to 2013. The frequency of independent director (in percentage) for range 30 to 40 and 40 to 
50 is the highest. It is in the range of 34% to 36% for category >30-40 and 27% to 40% for 
category >40-50 from years 2009 to 2013. There is only less than 30% of sample companies 
have more than 50% of independent directors over total directors from years 2009 to 2013. 
Overall, the presence of independent directors in most of the sampled companies is only 50% or 
less.  MCCG requires that more than one third of the members should be independent directors 
on the board, so the companies just fulfil the one third requirement and should increase the 
independent directors to two third for a sound corporate governance.
By categorizing the sampled companies from auditor switching aspect, it is noticed that 
huge difference occurred between the switch and no switch of auditors from years 2009 to 
2013, where the ratio is 1:3. The percentage of no switch is higher due to the culture adopted 
in sampled companies from years 2009 to 2013.  Malaysian companies tend to maintain a long-
term relationship with other parties as it is believed that relationship is the key to success.*   For 
the sampled companies that switch their auditors, the direction of switching is more towards 
the non-Big 4 firm. It may be due to few factors such as to hide the reasons behind the auditor 
switching (Chadegani et al, 2011) as they give lower quality of monitoring. 
REGRESSIONS ANALYSIS
Table 4 Summary of Regression Analysis
Model
Unstandardized Coefficients
t-value
B Std. Error
Model 1: CG and FP
ROA (Constant) -0.091 1.895 -0.048 ns
CSIZE 0.719 0.189 3.807**
DUAL 0.267 0.697 0.384 ns
SIZE 0.362 0.160 2.259*
ID -7.120 2.340 -3.043**
R2 =0.072 F value=9.608
Adjusted R2=0.065 F significance=0.000
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ROE (Constant) -2.621 2.926 -0.896 ns
CSIZE 1.491 0.292 5.108**
DUAL 0.344 1.076 0.319 ns
SIZE 0.558 0.247 2.256*
ID -9.676 3.614 -2.677**
R2 =0.090 F value=12.238
Adjusted R2=0.083 F significance=0.000
TOBINQ (Constant) 0.768 0.114 6.723 ns
CSIZE -0.009 0.011 -0.754 ns
DUAL -0.115 0.042 -2.745**
SIZE 0.010 0.010 1.039 ns
ID -0.474 0.141 -3.357**
R2 =0.046 F value=6.007
Adjusted R2=0.039 F significance=0.000
Model 2: CG and AS
AS (Constant) 0.268 0.117 2.304 ns
CSIZE -0.021 0.012 -1.841 ns
DUAL -0.089 0.043 -2.076*
SIZE -0.004 0.010 -0.361 ns
ID 0.097 0.144 0.676 ns
R2 =0.015 F value=1.900
Adjusted R2=0.007 F significance=0.100
Model 3: AS and FP
ROA (Constant) -0.860 1.072 -0.803 ns
CSIZE 0.743 0.184 4.041**
AS 0.391 0.741 0.528 ns
R2 =0.032 F value=8.197
Adjusted R2=0.028 F significance=0.000
ROE (Constant) -3.417 1.649 -2.072 ns
CSIZE 1.549 0.283 5.473**
AS 1.044 1.140 0.916 ns
R2 =0.057 F value=15.123
Adjusted R2=0.054 F significance=0.000
TOBINQ (Constant) 0.576 0.065 8.901 ns
CSIZE -0.004 0.011 -0.353 ns
AS 0.024 0.045 0.526 ns
R2 =0.001 F value=0.214
Adjusted R2=-0.003 F significance=0.807
Table 4 (Cont. )
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Model 4: CG, AS, and FP
ROA (Constant) -0.242 1.905 -0.127 ns
DUAL 0.317 0.700 0.453 ns
SIZE 0.364 0.160 2.270*
ID -7.175 2.342 -3.063**
AS 0.562 0.731 0.769 ns
CSIZE 0.731 0.190 3.856**
R2 =0.073 F value=7.798
Adjusted R2=0.064 F significance=0.000
ROE (Constant) -2.967 2.941 -1.009 ns
DUAL 0.458 1.081 0.424 ns
SIZE 0.562 0.247 2.275*
ID -9.801 3.615 -2.712**
AS 1.288 1.128 1.142 ns
CSIZE 1.518 0.293 5.187**
R2 =0.092 F value=10.057
Adjusted R2=0.083 F significance=0.000
TOBINQ (Constant) 0.763 0.115 6.635 ns
DUAL -0.114 0.042 -2.689**
SIZE 0.010 0.010 1.046 ns
ID -0.476 0.141 -3.367 **
AS 0.020 0.044 0.455 ns
CSIZE -0.008 0.011 -0.713 ns
R2 =0.047 F value=4.839
Adjusted R2=0.047 F significance=0.000
* represents P<0.05 (significant); ** represents P<0.01 (significant); ns represents non-significant
 In model 1, it examines the association between corporate governance and financial 
performance. CEO/chairman duality is not statistically strong and significant (p-value<0.01) 
and negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q only with a t-value of -2.745. The result is consistent 
with Hsu et al. (2012). This suggests that separation of position for BOD chairman and CEO 
leads to better overseeing of the management on behalf of shareholders. For board size, no 
statistically significant linear dependence of the mean of Tobin’s Q on it is detected. On the 
other hand, it is statistically significant (p-value<0.05) and positively correlated with ROA and 
ROE with a t-value of 2.259 and 2.256 respectively. The result is consistent with Belkhir (2008). 
This suggests that a large board size plays better roles in monitoring management and leads 
them to a better decision. It also shows that strong statistically significant (p-value<0.01) linear 
dependence of the mean of ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q on independent directors is detected. 
It is negatively correlated with ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q with t-value of -3.043, -2.677, and 
-3.357 respectively. This suggests that independent directors do not definitely result in good 
firm performance. When they do not play their role properly, it can prompt faulty investment 
Table 4 (Cont. )
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decisions. The result is inconsistent with Pathan et al (2008), who stated that independent 
directors could oversee the management and retain market’s reputation.
In model 2, it examines the relationship between corporate governance and auditor 
switching. No statistically significant linear dependence of the mean of auditor switching on 
board size and presence of independent directors is detected. However, CEO/chairman duality 
is statistically significant (p-value<0.05) and negatively correlated with auditor switching with 
a t-value of -2.076. It is inconsistent with past studies, for instance, Lin and Liu (2010) and 
Ianniello et al (2013). It is due to the fact that all the past studies were conducted in foreign 
countries. In Malaysia, there is a long-term relationship with auditor when CEO/chairman 
duality leads to the low tendency of auditor switching. Moreover, the importance of auditor is 
of less concern and a high power distance in Malaysia that focuses on top-down relationship 
causes no objection from board members and independent directors when a less important 
decision such as auditor switching decision is made.
In model 3, it examines the association between auditor switching and financial 
performance. No statistically significant linear dependence of the mean of financial performance 
on auditor switching is detected. This reveals that auditors do not have a direct effect towards 
financial performance as auditors are not the people who manage the company. The result is 
inconsistent with Chang et al (2008) who discovered that companies got positive earnings no 
matter the switching to big 4 or non-big 4. Model 4, examines the association between corporate 
governance, auditor switching, and financial performance. The overall results and significant 
level of model 4 are the results of combination model 1, 2, and 3. 
Sobel Test
Table 5 Summary of Sobel Test
Independent 
Variable
Mediating 
Variable
Dependent 
Variable
t-value Full/Partially 
Mediation
CEO/chairman 
duality
Auditor switching
ROA -0.511 ns Full
ROE -0.837 ns Full
Tobin’s Q -0.516 ns Full
Board size Auditor switching
ROA -0.319 ns Full
ROE -0.367 ns Full
Tobin’s Q -0.320 ns Full
Presence of 
independent 
director
Auditor switching
ROA 0.415 ns Full
ROE 0.543 ns Full
Tobin’s Q 0.418 ns Full
ns represents non-significant
According to the table 5 above, there are full mediating effects of auditor switching. When 
examining relationship between corporate governance and financial performance, a significant 
relationship exists between them. However, when auditor switching is added as a mediator, no 
significant relationship exists between corporate governance and financial performance with 
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the justification being that the auditors are not part of the firm’s decision-making body, thus 
having to operate at the whims and caprices of those who appointed them regardless of what 
the law says. The implication here, therefore, is that the term or tenure of the auditors should 
be specific, at least three years as in Nigeria as specified in the Company and Allied Matters 
Act 2004 (CAMA, 2004 amended) if ever they will be re-appointed and the law should be 
stringent as to the exit and entry which may be factored along the line of global best practices, 
experience and reputation Geiger, et al., (2002) 
CONCLUSION
In a nutshell, existence of the association connecting corporate governance, auditor switching, 
and financial performance is evident. Companies should be more focused on corporate 
governance and auditor switching to enhance financial performance. However, Malaysian PLCs 
are still having low awareness on the importance of auditors even though all the hypotheses 
proposed in this study are supported. Therefore, more efforts are needed from government 
to facilitate and educate public on the importance of auditors to companies. However, this 
research suffered from few limitations. Firstly, the data used is secondary data and there is 
uncertainty over the data quality, especially where they are not made available to time and 
where they might have been doctored before the publication to suit the interest of the managers 
and shareholders. Secondly, this research covers PLCs only. Thirdly, it emphasises only on the 
nominal variable for auditor switching. It suggests that interview can be conducted to explore 
this relationship. Additional information can be obtained due to the flexibility in expressing 
words. Moreover, the future researchers can include private companies as samples to strengthen 
the representativeness of the study. Furthermore, considering the qualitative variables such 
as the reasons for auditor switching as the proxies for the latter in future research will be an 
enhancement of the required knowledge base in studies of this nature.
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